The Compromise Algorithm in the Swedish PhD Admissions Problem
(2016) NEKP01 20152Department of Economics
 Abstract
 What mechanism should be designed to allocate PhD applicants to universities in Sweden? We introduce the Swedish PhD admissions problem, and it is influenced by the college admissions problem (Gale and Shapley 1962) and the student placement problem (Balinski and Sönmez 1999). In order to “solve” this problem, we design a novel mechanism, namely the compromise algorithm. We propose three theorems from this algorithm, i.e. equivalence theorems. The equivalence theorems specify the equivalence relations among stability, worse and responsiveness. Additionally, we find a positive result that the number of fields determines the strategyproofness of the algorithm; meanwhile, the student optimal stable matching and the university optimal stable... (More)
 What mechanism should be designed to allocate PhD applicants to universities in Sweden? We introduce the Swedish PhD admissions problem, and it is influenced by the college admissions problem (Gale and Shapley 1962) and the student placement problem (Balinski and Sönmez 1999). In order to “solve” this problem, we design a novel mechanism, namely the compromise algorithm. We propose three theorems from this algorithm, i.e. equivalence theorems. The equivalence theorems specify the equivalence relations among stability, worse and responsiveness. Additionally, we find a positive result that the number of fields determines the strategyproofness of the algorithm; meanwhile, the student optimal stable matching and the university optimal stable matching can be treated as special cases of our model when we restrict the number of fields. Generally, the compromise algorithm generates a stable matching that falls in between the student optimal stable matching and the university optimal stable matching. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/studentpapers/record/8593763
 author
 Miao, Dingquan ^{LU}
 supervisor

 Jens Gudmundsson ^{LU}
 organization
 course
 NEKP01 20152
 year
 2016
 type
 H2  Master's Degree (Two Years)
 subject
 keywords
 Matching, Swedish PhD Admissions Problem, Stability, Compromise Algorithm
 language
 English
 id
 8593763
 date added to LUP
 20160217 15:00:27
 date last changed
 20160217 15:00:28
@misc{8593763, abstract = {What mechanism should be designed to allocate PhD applicants to universities in Sweden? We introduce the Swedish PhD admissions problem, and it is influenced by the college admissions problem (Gale and Shapley 1962) and the student placement problem (Balinski and Sönmez 1999). In order to “solve” this problem, we design a novel mechanism, namely the compromise algorithm. We propose three theorems from this algorithm, i.e. equivalence theorems. The equivalence theorems specify the equivalence relations among stability, worse and responsiveness. Additionally, we find a positive result that the number of fields determines the strategyproofness of the algorithm; meanwhile, the student optimal stable matching and the university optimal stable matching can be treated as special cases of our model when we restrict the number of fields. Generally, the compromise algorithm generates a stable matching that falls in between the student optimal stable matching and the university optimal stable matching.}, author = {Miao, Dingquan}, keyword = {Matching,Swedish PhD Admissions Problem,Stability,Compromise Algorithm}, language = {eng}, note = {Student Paper}, title = {The Compromise Algorithm in the Swedish PhD Admissions Problem}, year = {2016}, }